One area of jurisdictional discretion in which the Court has recently exhibited a growing tendency to deprive itself of competence is its approach to ascertaining the critical date for jurisdiction. In particular, the 2011 judgment of the Court in the case of Georgia v Russian Federation arguably departed from a century of previous jurisprudence, applying a formalist approach that assessed jurisdiction solely by reference to the date of seisin. 4 By declining to consider the potential resolution of procedural defects after this date, the Court seemingly telegraphed a shift away from the realism evident in decisions as recent as Croatia v Serbia.
5
A review of the Court's current docket of pending cases demonstrates the current significance of this issue, with Colombia having invoked the Court's recent tendency towards formalism to argue that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate one of its ongoing disputes with Nicaragua. 6 For academic observers of the Court, this vacillating approach to assessing the critical date for jurisdiction is a prime example of how the Court's exercise of discretion can influence its jurisdictional reach. It is accordingly both a key indicator of the Court's perception of its own institutional purpose and its effectiveness in performing this role. It is through the prism of this narrow temporal issue of jurisdiction that this paper shall thus seek to expound a more comprehensive macro-analysis of the Court's current geopolitical function.
It will be argued that the Court's recent adherence to the formalist approach when assessing the critical date for jurisdiction is unfortunate in two key respects: first in depriving the Court of opportunities to fulfil what should be its primary function of developing international law, and second in betraying an institution that has applied formalism on an ad hoc basis to engage in case-selection on political grounds. Section B will begin by introducing the normative dichotomy between formalism and realism within the context of the critical date. 7 Section C will examine the relevant jurisprudence of the Court, discerning a recent trend away from realism and towards formalism. This will lay the foundations for Section D, an 4 (Georgia v Russian Federation) , Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, 70 (Georgia) . 5 For the somewhat narrower purpose of this article, the term formalism is used to refer to the strict adherence to fixed procedural rules regardless of the congruity of practical consequence. Conversely, realism advocates a more flexible approach that takes into account all prevailing circumstances to reach a pragmatic conclusion that is more consistent with the Court's institutional objectives. More detail on the practical differences between the two approaches as derived from the relevant case law is set out in Section B below.
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appraisal of the Court's current position on the critical date through an analysis of the circumstances that triggered the apparent change of approach in Georgia, and how the reasoning in that case has been applied in subsequent judgments. Finally, Section E will consider the Court's approach to temporal matters of jurisdiction within the wider context of its overall effectiveness, arguing for a more flexible approach to jurisdiction informed by realism and concluding with some suggestions for the future.
B. FORMALISM, REALISM AND THE CRITICAL DATE
In the Arrest Warrant case, the Court noted that its settled jurisprudence required jurisdiction to be 'determined at the time that the act instituting proceedings was filed'. 8 Judicial statements such as this are indicative of a jurisprudence constante, reflecting a number of previous judgments that have expressed the same view. 9 However, the Court has in certain circumstances been willing to apply a more realistic approach to ascertaining the critical date.
The result is that it has not always proved necessary for jurisdictional preconditions to have crystallised at the date of filing.
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This qualification to the jurisprudence constante has its roots in judgments dating back to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and its decision in the Mavromattis case. 11 In that case, Greece as the applicant sought to establish jurisdiction against the United Kingdom pursuant to the Treaty of Lausanne, a convention that had not been ratified at the date of application but had entered into force by the time the PCIJ came to decide on jurisdiction.
12
In a celebrated judgment, the PCIJ held that a jurisdictional defect cured between the application and the date on which jurisdiction is assessed should not preclude the Court from hearing the merits:
The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law. been ratified, this circumstance would now be covered by the subsequent deposit of the necessary ratifications.
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This classic formulation of the realistic approach to assessing the critical date for jurisdiction has since passed into the annals of international law as the 'Mavromattis principle'.
The PCIJ's position that it would not permit a formalist approach to temporal matters to preclude jurisdiction was reiterated twelve months later in Certain German Interests, in which it once again opined that it would not 'allow itself to be hampered by a mere defect of form, the removal of which depends solely on the Party concerned'. 14 In this respect, the central pillar of the realism embodied by the Mavromattis principle is the upholding of jurisdiction in circumstances where an applicant would be entitled to file fresh proceedings with any previous procedural defects cured. Conversely, the formalist approach disregards any subsequent developments and assesses jurisdiction strictly by reference to the date of seisin.
The procedural rationale for the realism encapsulated by the PCIJ jurisprudence is axiomatic. In situations where jurisdictional defects are resolved between the date of seisin and the Court's ruling on jurisdiction, an adverse finding merely requires the applicant to go through the formalities of commencing a fresh claim. The force of the Court's judgment is therefore limited to a temporary stay that, through the delay of proceedings and increases in costs (both for the parties and for the Court itself), serves only to diminish judicial efficiency and delay settlement of the dispute. Justifiably described by Schreuer as anomalous and paradoxical, such consequences are not consistent with the promotion of the Court as a just and efficient adjudicator of international disputes. 15 The realist approach is thus validated on both procedural and substantive grounds, ameliorating judicial profligacy whilst increasing the quantity of cases that come before the Court.
The contrasting formalist approach to assessing the critical date has its own merits, as It is indisputable that these virtues of formalism are paramount within the Court's practice. However, there is a disparity between the protected norms elucidated above that compels a preference for the realism of the Mavromattis principle. The imperative of avoiding the denial of justice and procedural delay that results from the formalist position must outweigh the need to preserve any artificial strand of legal certainty, particularly when such certainty can nonetheless be attained through consistent application of the Mavromattis principle. Further, requiring applicants to go through the arbitrary steps of filing a fresh claim negates any judicial economy achieved through the avoidance of premature proceedings. The denial of jurisdiction in circumstances where an applicant would be entitled to file anew with all procedural defects resolved is not only 'excessively formalistic' but ultimately ineffective, 19 and the Court should not undermine its own legitimacy through engaging in acts of futility. As Kolb observes, preference of a realistic approach should therefore be a corollary of the Court's desire 'not to excessively hinder access to it, although obviously without ignoring the peremptory rules regarding its jurisdiction'.
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C. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT: FROM REALISM TO FORMALISM
Early realism
Following the jurisprudence of the PCIJ, the Court in early decisions such as Northern Cameroons signalled that it would maintain a realistic approach to temporal matters of jurisdiction. 21 The critical date demanded further evaluation in the Court's decision on preliminary objections in the landmark Nicaragua case, in which the cure of procedural defects was just one of a myriad of jurisdictional issues. 
Judicial vacillation in the FRY judgments
The realistic approach adopted in Nicaragua was largely followed by the Court in a series of cases derived from the wars of dissolution that took place in the What matters is that, at the latest by the date when the Court decides on its jurisdiction, the applicant must be entitled, if it so wishes, to bring fresh proceedings in which the initially unmet condition would be fulfilled. In such a situation, it is not in the interests of the sound administration of justice to compel the applicant to begin the proceedings anew -or to initiate fresh proceedings -and it is preferable, except in special circumstances, to conclude that the condition has, from that point on, been fulfilled.
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The decision of the majority in Croatian Genocide was however subject to strong (CERD), 36 and sought to establish reciprocal jurisdiction pursuant to the compromissory clause at article 22 thereof. In response, Russia submitted a total of four preliminary objections to jurisdiction, the second of which argued that the procedural preconditions of article 22 had not been satisfied prior to the date of seisin. 37 In response to an application for provisional measures made by Georgia, the Court initially held that it possessed the prima facie jurisdiction necessary to make an interim order. 38 However, the Court's final decision on jurisdiction upheld Russia's second objection and consequently declined jurisdiction to hear the merits.
According to the Court, article 22 of CERD required inter alia the parties to have conducted negotiations that had 'failed, became futile, or reached a deadlock before Georgia submitted its claim to the Court.' 39 Having adopted this formalist position on the critical date for assessing jurisdiction, the Court reviewed the diplomatic exchanges that took place between the dispute arising and the date of filing (9-12 August 2008) and concluded that these preconditions had not been satisfied. The alternative realist approach -which would have accounted for the conduct of negotiations after the date of seisin -was advocated in strong terms by five judges in a Joint Dissenting Opinion, which lamented the Court's departure from the flexibility most recently espoused in Croatian Genocide.
b) Prosecute or Extradite
Whilst the judgment in Georgia was the first outside the context of the FRY cases to signify a departure from the Court's previous realism, it was quickly followed by another case in which an ostensibly similar approach was adopted. In Belgium v Senegal, Belgium alleged that Senegal had breached its international obligations by failing to procure the extradition or prosecution of former Chad president Hissène Habré. 41 In addition to claims premised on the observed that matters of procedure perhaps even represent an exception to the general rule against stare decisis within the Court's jurisprudence. 55 Plainly, the Georgia judgment critically undermines these assertions.
D. GEORGIA -TURNING POINT OR JUDICIAL ANOMALY?
The decision of the Court in Georgia thus created a schism within its own jurisprudence -all the more significant because it involved the explicit rejection of the Court's own prima facie conclusion at the provisional measures stage of the same case. But whether this decision was a judicial anomaly or deliberate turning point in the Court's approach remains to be seen. From a practical perspective, this ambiguity is clearly undesirable. This section will therefore seek to analyse the legal and political factors that influenced the Court's conclusions in Georgia,
how that judgment has been extrapolated as judicial authority in subsequent cases, and the implications of these developments for the present status of the Mavromattis principle.
Legal reasoning a) Submissions of the parties
In its written submissions on preliminary objections, Russia began by invoking the Joint 65 In the absence of any further background on the Georgian submissions, commentators can only speculate as to the reasons for this failure to invoke the Mavromattis principle. As discussed in Section D, subsection 2 below, this decision may be indicative of a desire for jurisdiction to be refused, the result of wider political considerations that shaped Georgian litigation strategy in the case.
Alternatively, it was perhaps a strategic decision intended to focus judicial minds on the prevailing circumstances at the date of seisin.
b) Judgment on preliminary objections
Perhaps reflecting the sparse attention afforded to the issue in the parties' submissions, the majority's judgment in Georgia gave short shrift to temporal matters. The Court simply reiterated at several points of the judgment that preconditions to jurisdiction must 'in principle exist at the time the Application is submitted'. 66 Nevertheless, the Court has been criticised for the strength of its arguments on this issue, with Quintana questioning both the inclusion of the debilitating words 'in principle' and the reference to the views of the parties on an issue that was purportedly an established principle of procedure. 67 The majority's brief espousal of a formalistic approach to determining jurisdiction was also subjected to strong criticism in a Joint
Dissenting Opinion promulgated by five members of the Court, who argued that the Court should have upheld jurisdiction to hear the merits of Georgia's claim. 68 The joint dissenters began by acknowledging the general principle that jurisdiction must be assessed as of the date of filing. 87 Nonetheless, it has consistently held that the presence of fundamentally political aspects of cases does not preclude the Court's ability to adjudicate. 88 This approach has been criticised by commentators such as Sugihara, who suggest that the legitimacy of the Court would be consolidated through 'resolving routine and politically less important disputes rather than dealing with politically sensitive cases'. 89 Such reservations are however misplaced.
Although the Court must not abandon its primary role as a fundamentally legal institution, an approach that requires it to shy away from making decisions of political consequence would render it superfluous within the modern geopolitical landscape. A functionally apolitical world court would not be compatible with the modern demands of international dispute resolution.
Nonetheless, the historic truism that 'hard cases make bad law' may equate at the international level to the Court's adjudication of highly political cases. Greenwood's election to the Court during the intervening years and subsequent vote in favour of the majority decision against jurisdiction was therefore another institutional component in the final outcome.
Georgia as authority: Prosecute or Extradite
The first indication that Georgia was perhaps representative of a burgeoning trend of formalism would come just a year later in Prosecute or Extradite. As in Georgia, legal reasoning on the majority's non-application of the Mavromattis principle was meagre. More detailed scrutiny was therefore left to the Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham, who dissented on the Court's finding of no jurisdiction (as he had as a signatory to the Joint Dissenting Opinion in Georgia).
For Judge Abraham, the Court in Prosecute or Extradite had not followed the position adopted in Georgia but gone a 'particularly clear step further in the formalistic approach'.
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The result of this was that the applicability of the Mavromattis principle as endorsed in
Croatian Genocide was now in question. 101 This conclusion was largely premised on
Abraham's argument that the Georgia judgment did not constitute a 'departure from the former jurisprudence of the Court', 102 seemingly because the Court's non-application of the Mavromattis principle in that case was ultimately immaterial to the conclusions reached and therefore represented obiter dicta. 103 Moreover, Abraham noted, the majority in Georgia had 'very prudently' stated that the general rule that the dispute must exist as at the date of filing applied only 'in principle'.
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Abraham's attempts to distinguish Georgia from previous cases are not persuasive.
Even once the majority in Georgia had concluded that the precondition of negotiation had not been settled at any time prior to the Court's judgment on preliminary objections, a realist approach could still have been maintained through a parallel analysis that reiterated the applicability of the Mavromattis principle whilst simultaneously acknowledging that it did not in Georgia alter the outcome. In contrast, the Court simply restated the general rule that jurisdiction be assessed at the date of seisin. Abraham's suggestion that Georgia did not in this respect represent a departure from cases such as Croatian Genocide therefore has an air of the artificial. Nevertheless, Prosecute or Extradite represents a definite furtherance of the formalist trend first identifiable in Georgia for the following reason identified by Abraham:
[T]his is the first time in the Court's entire jurisprudence that it has declined to hear one part of a case on the basis of the lack of a dispute between the Parties, even though the dispute clearly exists on the date of the Court's Judgment and was apparent in the proceedings before the Court.
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On this basis, Abraham's stated concern for the future of the realistic approach most recently elucidated in Croatian Genocide is well-founded.
The non-application of the Mavromattis principle in Prosecute or Extradite has however been subject to the same accusations of judicial avoidance that have plagued other formalist decisions. Kreß criticises the Court's refusal to extend its analysis to include customary law principles as 'the most recent instance of the Court's inclination to avoid certain difficult issues pertaining to the law of armed conflicts'. 106 This was further reflected in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sur, who characterised the Court's application of the formalist approach as an unjustified and unfounded means of evading the deliberation and potential denial of the customary rule claimed by Belgium. 107 Sur concluded on stronger terms by accusing the Court of having 'failed fully to carry out its task of settling the dispute'. 108 On this basis, the normative reliance on formalism in Prosecute or Extradite is perhaps no more authoritative than the politically charged conclusions in Georgia and Legality of Use of Force.
Concluding observations on the current applicability of the Mavromattis principle
It is perhaps too early to offer a full evaluation of whether Georgia represents a turning point in the Court's approach to the Mavromattis principle. Despite the initial support offered by the decision in Prosecute or Extradite, reliance on two judgments is sufficient only to discern an emerging trend rather than a decisive departure from almost a century of contrasting jurisprudence. Until the Court returns to this issue in future cases, observations as to the true impact of Georgia will therefore remain conjecture. Nevertheless, inferences can be drawn from the relevant jurisprudence with a view to approximating the Court's current position on the Mavromattis principle. On this basis, it is submitted that the new formalist cases are not indicative of a pivotal shift in legal reasoning within the Court. Instead, they demonstrate that application of the Mavromattis principle represents a discretionary jurisdictional filter that facilitates the advancement of cases that the Court wishes to hear and impedes those it does not. The Court therefore adopts a teleological, ad-hoc approach to each case that elides any consistent jurisprudential philosophy. Several observations can be made in support of this conclusion.
First, the absence of detailed legal reasoning to justify non-application of the Mavromattis principle in the new formalist cases undermines any normative reliance on those decisions as authority for a decisive change in approach. In such circumstances, the influence of external realpolitik must be attributed greater normative weight. Second, the refusal by the Court to commit to a comprehensively reasoned and definitive position in favour of formalism (to be contrasted with the willingness of the dissenters in Georgia and Prosecute or Extradite to come out firmly in support of realism) can be seen as the Court keeping its options open, preserving for itself the ability to fluctuate between the different positions where convenient in future cases. Third, whilst it has been argued that the cases in which a formalist approach has been applied can be largely attributed to external political considerations or judicial avoidance rather than strict evolution in jurisdictional ratio decidendi, the same can also arguably be said of the preceding realist cases.
As noted by Shany, the decisions to apply the Mavromattis principle in Nicaragua and
Croatian Genocide were perhaps equally motivated by institutional policy considerations, and 108 ibid.
in particular by the 'desire of the Court to adjudicate use of force cases, as part of its mandate of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security'. 109 On this basis, the Mavromattis principle has only ever been a convenient means of case selection, with any artificial strand of historic consistency indicative only of the Court's epochal willingness to adjudicate politically sensitive cases. This oscillating approach has continued to the present day, where the ad-hoc adoption of the formalist approach in recent cases remains demonstrative only of the Court's willingness to disregard its broader institutional goals and engage in a form of case-selection predicated on judicial and political convenience.
E. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COURT
This paper has outlined some of the procedural difficulties that result from the Court's vacillating methodology for ascertaining the critical date for jurisdiction. Yet beyond the narrower sphere of preliminary objections, the application of a formalist approach to jurisdiction (whether on a blanket or ad-hoc basis) has a number of wider implications that resonate throughout the Court's entire institutional function. To properly assess the full consequences, this paper will first consider the Court's broader objectives as the world's premier judicial institution, a topic that has itself been the subject of much debate. Having expressed a view on this issue, it will then consider the implications of recent jurisprudence on the Court's overall effectiveness, before finally seeking to plot a more coherent path forward.
The Court's essential function
Debate around the proper scope of the Court's role within the international legal order has endured since its establishment. Academic theory has generally focused on two polarised theories, broadly categorised by Kolb as judicial activism and judicial restraint. 110 The former advocates an expansive and confident Court, tackling a high volume of wide-ranging cases and using its docket as a means of facilitating the development of international law; the latter ascribes the Court a narrower, more conservative function, deferring strictly to the intentions of states and adjudicating only those issues in dispute. This philosophical divergence echoes the dichotomy between realism and formalism evident within the Court's approach to jurisdiction. Any normative analysis of how the Court should exercise its mandate at the jurisdictional level thus necessitates a prior conclusion on its broader function as an international judicial institution.
The Court itself has in the past endorsed the narrower interpretation of its own mandate, explicitly rejecting any notion that it possesses either the power or inclination to explicitly develop the law. This was acknowledged in its advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons, where the Court opined that 'its task is to engage in its normal judicial function of ascertaining the existence or otherwise of legal principles and rules '. 111 This conservative view places emphasis on judicial restraint and a cautious approach to adjudicating claims that limits the Court's function to the strict settlement of individual disputes. Proponents of this view find conventional support in article 59 of the Statute, which Zimmermann and others suggest was 'intended to underline the opinion that the Court should not be considered a law-making or law-creating institution'. 112 There is also an institutional imperative for this approach, with traditionally conservative states likely to withdraw consensual jurisdiction in response to any suspicion that the Court is overreaching its constitutional directive. 113 Berman therefore submits that the Court has to date adopted an 'essentially conservative' approach to deciding contentious cases, emphasising fair and objectively reasoned settlements to specific disputes as opposed to using cases as a means of making pronouncements that purport to develop the law. In practice, an expansive approach by the Court to development of the law is to be welcomed. In a system as decentralised and fragmented as international law -absent a singular legislature able to express a normative consensus among states, and subject to nebulous constructs such as state practice and opinio juris -the Court should embrace its ability to contribute to a more coherent body of law. In such circumstances, it is legitimate and convenient that 'vacuums and failures observed in the rules in force are either filled up or corrected by the international judiciary'. 122 Failure by the Court to seize any reasonable opportunity to pronounce on important legal matters exacerbates not only the inherent ambiguities of international law, but also its own irrelevance as a judicial institution. Its approach to assessing jurisdiction must therefore be commensurate with this primary objective.
Hence, by expanding the circumstances in which a Court can uphold jurisdiction to pronounce upon the applicable law relevant to the merits of a claim, the approach most consistent with a more effective Court is the brand of realism exemplified by application of the Mavromattis principle.
Implications of the Court's current approach a) Inhibition of development of the law
It has been argued above that the primary function of the Court should be the development of international law. Boyle and Chinkin observe that the ability of the Court to fulfil this role ultimately depends on 'how many cases are brought…and the significance of those cases in terms of raising new and contested legal issues'. 123 Whilst this view is superficially correct, it overlooks an important intervening factor that also impacts the Court's ability to develop the law: the Court's own approach in cases that turn on an exercise of jurisdictional discretion. By necessitating the refusal of jurisdiction in a greater number of cases and thereby reducing the range of substantive law matters it is able to adjudicate on, the formalist approach to assessing the critical date has a detrimental impact on the Court's broader institutional effectiveness. Second, the Court's willingness to take refuge in a formalist approach to avoid pronouncing on the merits of a claim exposes the extent to which it remains susceptible to the vagaries of realpolitik. In cases such as Georgia, the Court has seemingly conflated its own exercise of jurisdictional discretion with its desire to avoid deciding matters of political sensitivity. The result is that it has too often adopted an insipid approach to jurisdiction when it is politically convenient to do so. Although the Court cannot function within a political vacuum, it must strive to 'construct a zone for autonomous legal decision-making, immune from political considerations'. 132 In such a zone, the Court's primary objective of developing international law would take priority over the type of political consideration that arguably prevailed in Georgia.
A path to realism
It is clear that an ad-hoc approach to assessing the critical date for jurisdiction is not sustainable for any legitimacy-seeking institution. To mitigate this unacceptable ambiguity, the Court must therefore opt for a decisive and blanket adoption of a singular jurisdictional paradigm. As has been argued, the procedural merits of the realistic approach, together with the need for the Court to play a central role in the development of international law, dictate that it should explicitly discard the doctrine of formalism and instead apply the Mavromattis principle wherever feasible. Focus must then turn to the most appropriate method of achieving this objective.
The least intrusive manner of implementing this change would be through an evolution in judicial reasoning in future cases. The Mavromattis principle is itself a creature of judicial law-making; whilst it is disappointing that the Court has more recently seen fit to depart from this rule, there is nothing to prevent it from returning to it. An early opportunity for such a change in policy may be provided by the Court's decision on jurisdiction in the pending case between Colombia and Nicaragua, with Colombia having submitted preliminary objections expressly invoking the formalist position adopted by the Court in both Georgia and Prosecute or Extradite. 133 However, a change in approach on this basis would remain susceptible to subsequent modifications in much the same way that the new formalist cases have supplanted historic realism. In this respect, a reasoned change of approach by the Court does not adequately curtail its current ad-hoc policy.
The most revolutionary change to the Court's framework would be the disposal of the consensual model in favour of compulsory jurisdiction. The UN is almost unique in providing for the non-compulsory jurisdiction of its principal judicial organ, with organisations such as the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization all requiring compulsory jurisdiction as a concomitant of membership. The consequence, Higgins suggests, is that 'the Court is too often examining objections to its own jurisdiction, rather than addressing the serious substantive problems at issue'. 134 If judicial restraint is a 'logical corollary' of the Court's consensual jurisdiction, 135 any notion of jurisdiction based on consent necessitates the type of formalist position adopted by the Court in more recent cases. But whilst the doctrine of compulsory jurisdiction has merits beyond the scope of this article, 136 it remains an alteration to the Court's constitution as drastic as it is unlikely. It is therefore a disproportionate and inconvenient solution to the present issue.
The preferred option for firmly establishing a policy of jurisdictional realism within the Court's approach to the critical date must strike an appropriate balance between the evolution and revolution of the foregoing two proposals. To this end, there is a clearly identifiable method for establishing a definitive yet proportionate modification to the Court's jurisdictional framework. The formalist rule that jurisdiction be assessed at the date of seisin is again a jurisprudence constante derived from the Court's own jurisprudence. In the absence of any existing conventional rule, the Court could take definitive steps to provide formal clarification on this temporal element of jurisdiction in the form of a Practice Direction. Indeed, similar action has been taken in the past with the express intention of increasing productivity. 137 The form of any formal directive would be the subject of extensive debate, but would essentially confirm the validity of any jurisdictional precondition absent at the date of seisin but satisfied prior to the Court's final decision on competence. Whilst the enactment of a Practice Direction on these terms might attract criticism as a unilateral and unfounded exercise of control over the Court's own procedural framework, it would nevertheless represent a conclusive and welcome shift away from formalism and also provide certainty by clarifying the ambiguity that currently prevails.
F. CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of the Court is 'decisively influenced' by its jurisdictional reach. 138 Its exercise of discretion as regards temporal matters of jurisdiction is thus fundamental to its overall success. Regrettably, the Court has more recently shunned an expansive approach to upholding jurisdiction. It has instead demonstrated an increased propensity to decline jurisdiction by applying a formalistic approach to assessment of the critical date. Moreover, it has seemingly done so on an ad-hoc basis as a convenient means of judicial avoidance. It has been argued in this article that this refusal to seize jurisdiction critically undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Court as the world's premier judicial institution, first by depriving it of opportunities to develop international law and second in betraying its continuing susceptibility to external realpolitik. In contrast, the Mavromattis principle -the product of a welcome display of institutional dexterity by the PCIJ almost a century ago -remains an innovative concept within the Court's procedural armoury that has facilitated important contributions at the merits stages of cases such as Nicaragua and Croatian Genocide. By disenfranchising itself from this tool and the flexibility evident in its own jurisprudence, the Court has become the architect of its own diminished relevance.
But this current reticence to adopt an expansive approach to settling international disputes need not be terminal. This article has sought to demonstrate how the Court's effectiveness could be enhanced through the adoption of a blanket approach of realism when assessing the satisfaction of jurisdictional preconditions, and made some suggestions as to how this may be achieved. Whether the Court seeks to implement any of these modifications in approach remains to be seen. One institutional cause for optimism is the recent election of These institutional developments engender some promise for the immediate future of the Court. Nevertheless, implementation of the brand of realism advocated by this article will ultimately depend on the Court's willingness and ability to overcome the permeation of political considerations into matters of jurisdictional discretion. Only then will the Court be able to abandon the present ad-hoc approach to assessing the critical date. Once it does, eschewing the needless and formalistic adherence to the date of seisin as the critical date for assessing jurisdiction and instead adopting a policy of realism in accounting for the post-filing resolution of jurisdictional defects will allow the Court to better fulfil its constitutional mandate.
